Events Calendar

Feb
18
Mon
Gabriel Carroll (Stanford) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Feb 18 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm

“When Are Robust Contracts Linear?” (joint with Daniel Walton)

Abstract:
We study a moral hazard situation in which a principal contracts with a counterparty, which may have its own internal organizational structure. The principal has non-Bayesian uncertainty as to what actions might be taken in response to the contract, and wishes to maximize her worst-case payoff. We show that if the possible responses to any given contract satisfy two axioms – a “richness” and a “responsiveness” axiom – then a linear contract is optimal. This general formulation encompasses not only direct contracting with an agent, but also various models of hierarchical contracting and contracting with teams of agents, showing that the arguments behind the robustness of linear contracts apply across a range of situations. We also further apply the modeling apparatus to compare the principal’s payoffs across different organizational structures.

Feb
19
Tue
Tongli Zhang (JHU) and Andreea Rotarescu (JHU) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Feb 19 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Feb
26
Tue
Anna Orlik (Fed Board) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Feb 26 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
4
Mon
Matias Iaryczower (Princeton) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 4 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
5
Tue
Prakash Loungani and Davide Furceri (IMF) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 5 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
11
Mon
Elena Antoniadou (Emory) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 11 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
12
Tue
Himanshu Verma (JHU) and Pablo Hernando-Kaminsky (JHU) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 12 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
25
Mon
Nageeb Ali (Penn State) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 25 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
26
Tue
Stefania Albanesi (University of Pittsburgh) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 26 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm
Mar
27
Wed
Sue Bahk (JHU) @ Department of Economics - Wyman W603
Mar 27 @ 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm