Hülya Eraslan

Associate Professor

Office: Mergenthaler Hall 433
Office Hours: Wed 13:00-15:00
Phone: 410.516.6118
Email: eraslan@jhu.edu
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  • My research program focuses on bargaining and voting with applications to political economy and corporate finance, both theoretically and empirically. Recent theoretical work analyzes the role of communication in legislative bargaining and characterizes the conditions under which it is possible for legislators to credibly convey information regarding their private preferences during negotiations. My work on the comparison of majority voting rule and unanimity voting rule in asymmetric information environments establishes the conditions under which one dominates the other in terms of efficiency, and explains, among other things, why certain corporations issue bonds in the U.S. while others issue in Europe. My work comparing voting rules in stochastic bargaining shows that unanimity rule may dominate majority rule in terms of efficiency, but may result in more unequal outcomes. In addition, my theoretical work establishing uniqueness equilibrium in a general legislative bargaining model has enabled the empirical researchers to take models to data in a variety of applications. My empirical research spans a variety of topics including negotiations in corporate bankruptcy reorganizations in the U.S., government formation negotiations in European parliamentary democracies, and Chapter 13 personal bankruptcies in the U.S.

  • Published Papers

    Information-Based Trade (with Philip Bond) (Formerly circulated under the title “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge with Endogenous Asset Values”), Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145, 1675-1703.

    Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals (with Philip Bond) (Formerly circulated under the title “Bargaining Collectively”), Review of Economic Studies, 2009, 77:2, 459-490.

    Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates from a Bargaining Model, International Economic Review, 2008, 49:2, 659-681.

    Bicameralism and Government Formation (with Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2007, 2, 227-252.

    Strategic Candidacy for Multivalued Voting Procedures (with Andy McLennan), Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 117, 29-54.

    A Structural Model of Government Formation (with Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo), Econometrica, January 2003, 71, 27-70.

    Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design (with Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo), European Economic Review, May 2002, 46, 893-907.

    Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining (with Antonio Merlo), Journal of Economic Theory, March 2002, 103, 31-48.

    Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model, Journal of Economic Theory, March 2002, 103, 11-30.

     

    Working Papers

    Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (with Ying Chen)

    The Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Under Chapter 13 (with Gizem Kosar, Wenli Li, Pierre Sarte)

    Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining (with Andy McLennan)

    Deliberation and Security Design in Bankruptcy (with Bilge Yilmaz)

  • 180.373
    The objective of this course is to familiarize students with financial, legal and strategic issues associated with corporate restructuring process. Focus of the course is on the restructuring of financially distressed firms. The course surveys a variety of restructuring methods (out-of-court workouts, exchange offers, prepackaged bankruptcies, Chapter 11 bankruptcies, insolvency practices in other countries) available to troubled firms. Throughout the course, attention is devoted equally among details of the legal framework; strategies available to the companies and their claimants under the legal framework they operate; and valuation tools. In addition, the course provides students with specialized vocabulary and important facts about the restructuring industry and distressed investing.

    180.602, Game Theory Module:
    The objective of this course is to introduce the students to the main game theoretic tools used in economics research. It is a seven week module of the Microeconomic Theory 180.602. It covers normal form games, extensive form games with perfect information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information.

    180.618 Game Theory
    This is a second-year doctoral course in game theory. My main goal is to make sure that (1) students who plan to pursue applied research learn game theoretic tools well enough to fully understand the game theoretic arguments in the papers they read, identify problematic modeling techniques, build and solve their own models; (2) students who plan to pursue theoretical research in game theory get exposed to active research topics. The topics we cover varies. Sample topics include repeated games, bargaining, voting, cheap talk, market microstructure, global games and network theory.